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ARTICLES
CLAIMS PROCEDURES IN LARGE CONSUMER
CLASS ACTIONS AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
OF BENEFITS
Gail Hillebrand* and Daniel Torrence**
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer class actions serve three goals: equity for the class
members, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and deterrence of future
wrongdoing.' Equity includes both the adequacy of the amount com-
pensated to the class and the fairness of the manner in which that
compensation is distributed among the class.' Settlements and judg-
ments in class action cases have often required class members to sub-
mit claims in order to share in the proceeds of the recovery. Recent
cases suggest that claims procedures are ill-suited to consumer class
actions in which the class size is very large and the amount of dam-
ages per class member is relatively small. These cases are character-
ized by very low claims rates.' A low claims rate may cause an ineq-
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L.J. 1591, 1594, 1596 (1987). See also 1 H. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTiONS § 1.05, at 7(1977) (one purpose of class actions is to provide "effective redress" to persons for whom "it is
not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of
small individual suits for damages") (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank Deposit Guar. Nat'l
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2. Note, Equitable Trusts, supra note 1, at 1596.
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uitable distribution of benefits among the class members. Those who
submit a claim receive benefits, while those who do not may receive
nothing.' There is also evidence that claims requirements are skewed
in favor of the more educated and more affluent.' A low claims rate
also frustrates the goals of deterrence and disgorgement. As the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has stated, "[diefendants may be permitted to
retain ill-gotten gains simply because their conduct harmed large
numbers of people in small amounts instead of small numbers of
people in large amounts."" The very low claims rates reported in
several recent cases involving large classes suggest that claims proce-
dures are inherently unlikely to be equitable to large consumer clas-
ses unless they are accompanied by other distribution mechanisms to
benefit nonclaiming class members.
This article will examine claims procedures as they have been
used in consumer class actions. It will explore the mechanisms courts
and counsel can use to augment claims procedures and thereby en-
sure that a claims requirement does not result in inadequate or ineq-
uitable distributions.' It concludes that the goals of deterrence of
wrongdoing and equity for disadvantaged class members demand the
creative use of "next best use" remedies such as the consumer trust
fund in conjunction with claims procedures.
II. CLAIMS PROCEDURES IN CLASS ACTION CASES
The benefits of a class action settlement or judgment can be
distributed in a number of ways." Most common is the settlement or
judgment which requires class members to make claims in order to
receive benefits. In his treatise on class actions, Professor Newberg
characterizes claims procedures as a type of "formula settlement," in
which the settlement states a formula by which the amount due each
claimant will be computed. This "ordinarily requires each class
member to file a statement of claim or of purchases in order to re-
cover." 9 Claims procedures can vary from a simple request for bene-
fits to requirements for sworn statements of entitlement detailing in-
formation documenting class membership and damages.10 The more
4. See infra notes 45-66 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 67-93 and accompanying text.
6. State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 472, 715 P.2d 564, 571, 224 Cal. Rptr.
605, 612 (1986).
7. See infra notes 94-152 and accompanying text.
8. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 12.35, at 570.
9. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 12.35, at 570.
10. See, e.g., Quirke v. Chessie Corp., 368 F. Supp. 558, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (settle-
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complex the claims requirements, the fewer class members may be
expected to make claims."
A. Claims Requirements Where the Per Capita Stake is Large
Claims requirements are most likely to be effective in delivering
'benefits to a class when the size of the typical claim or other charac-
teristics of the case make it likely that a high proportion of class
members will actually file a claim. Commercial class members, for
example, are likely to be sophisticated business entities who have
enough at stake so that they can reasonably be expected to learn
about and comply with a claims process. For example, In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation2 dealt with multidistrict price
fixing by numerous container manufacturers. In Corrugated, the
value of the claim in litigation was between $1,000 and $4,000 per
class member." In In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation,4 an-
other class action, 2,632 class member businesses actually filed
claims based upon 77% of all the affected purchases during the limi-
tations period. Those claims were expected to exhaust 97% of the
principal of the settlement fund. The average recovery in that case of
about $79,000 may explain the high claims rate.' 5 In a securities
case where the average claim filed was $2,848, 43% of the class filed
claims.
Claims procedures have also been used in class toxic tort and
personal injury actions. Recently, United Stated District Court
Judge Robert Merhige, Jr., ordered the A.H. Robins Company to
establish a $2.48 billion trust fund to provide funding for the esti-
ment reopened stock exchange offer, class members given additional time to accept the offer
and exchange stock); Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 469, 715 P.2d at 568, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 609(claims form mailed to 8.6 million households; consumers required to return claim form with-
out proof of purchase except that claimants submitting the largest one percent of the claims
were required to submit a notarized confirmation); In re Dairy Products Litigation, 1979-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,605 (D. Ariz. Oct. 26, 1978) (claims form required of each household
to state length of time household had been present in the state and the average number of
household members during period in question).
11. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 8.40, at 178-79.
12. 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. den., 456 U.S. 936 (1982).
13. Id. at 1334, 1337.
,14. 557 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Il1. 1983), affd. in part, rev'd in part, 744 F.2d 1252
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
15. Id. at 1098. The 2,632 claimants were paid a total of $208,000,000, making each
class member's recovery approximately $79,000. Id.
16. Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 622, 630 n.9 (D. Kan. 1976); 1 H. NEW-
BERG, supra note 1, Appendix 8-4, at 211.
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mated 200,000 Dalkon Shield intrauterine device claimants.17 If di-
vided evenly, this amount would provide $12,400 per claimant. 8
In both personal injury class cases and business class cases, the
per class member claim may be large enough that class members
who receive adequate notice can reasonably be expected to go to the
time and trouble to prepare and submit claims. However, this is not
true of consumer class cases.
B. Claims Requirements in Consumer Class Actions
Claims procedures are far less likely to be effective means for
broad and fair distribution of benefits in consumer class actions than
in other types of cases. A hallmark of the consumer class action is
large class size and relatively small damages per class member. For
example, in State v. Levi Strauss & Co., the class consisted of nearly
seven million households with a maximum recovery of $2.00 per
pair of Levi pants purchased. 9 Recent class action cases against
Wells Fargo Bank, Bank of America, and U.S. Sprint present simi-
larly large classes. In Stern v. U.S. Sprint, the class size was esti-
mated at 739,108.20 In Rebney v. Wells Fargo," the class included
more than 1,500,000 current checking account customers and a
large, undetermined number of former customers over a period of
more than ten years.22 In Rudolfi v. Bank of America,28 the class
included all persons who had commercial or consumer checking ac-
counts between 1973 and 1988, and was estimated at 8,890,000
persons.24
Where the plaintiff class numbers in the thousands or millions,
each with a relatively small claim, equitable distribution of benefits
17. Marcotte, $2.48 Billion Trust Fund, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 24, col. 1. See
also For Many Dalkon Shield Claimants Settlement Won't End The Trauma, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 9, 1988, at 27, col. 4.
18. The authors do not contend that this amount is adequate for the injuries suffered,
but merely contrast the $12,400 per class member stake in this tort class action fund with the
typical large consumer class action where the per class member share may be less than $100.
19. 41 Cal. 3d at 476-77, 715 P.2d at 573-74, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 614-15.
20. Stipulation and Plan of Settlement at 6, Stern v. U.S. Sprint, No. CA000933 (L.A.
Super. Ct. filed Feb. 12, 1988).
21. No. 720307 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 4, 1988).
22. C. Daniel Vencill, Economic Analysis and Estimates of Net Economic Benefits
Under Agreement for Settlement of Certain Class Actions Against Wells Fargo Bank and
Crocker Bank, N.A. and Crocker National Bank 1 (Dec. 30, 1988) [hereinafter Vencill Re-
port] (on file in the Santa Clara Law Review office).
23. Report and Resume of Sherman J. Maisel, Ph.D., Rudolfi v. Bank of America,
N.T. and S.A., No. 720308 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 16, 1987).
24. Id. at 5.
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presents a special challenge. The evidence on claims rates in such
cases suggests that claims procedures standing alone are extremely
unlikely to accomplish the goal of distributing benefits fairly among
the entire class.
III. EFFICACY OF CLAIMS PROCEDURES IN ACHIEVING
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS TO CONSUMER CLASS
MEMBERS
The data on claims rates in consumer class action settlements
raises serious questions about whether a claims-made procedure
standing alone can be fair to a class consisting of a large number of
consumers with relatively small individual claims.
In State v. Levi Strauss & Co.,25 only 14% to 33% of eligible
class members applied for refunds of clothing price overcharges.26 In
Mazur v. Behrens,27 a low claims rate in a real estate antitrust ac-
tion meant that the defendant paid only $210,000 of a $1,750,000
maximum agreed to in a partial settlement.28 Only 712 claims were
filed in Mazur out of an estimated class of 6,800, resulting in a
claims rate of 10.5%.29 In a recent settlement of a state-wide Califor-
nia case against Wells Fargo Bank, the claims rate for refunds was
significantly less than 5%."0
The Wells Fargo settlement included agreements concerning fu-
ture bank policies, short-term price freezes and rollbacks, and a lim-
ited fund for consumer education on banking issues.3" The settlement
provided that current customers would be eligible for a credit if they
agreed to take overdraft protection linked to a savings account or
credit card. Former customers became eligible for a partial refund of
charges for bounced check fees upon submission and approval of a
25. 41 Cal. 3d at 460, 715 P.2d at 564, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
26. Id. at 476, 715 P.2d at 573-74, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
27. 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,213 (N.D.III. Aug. 2, 1974).
28. Id.
29. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 8.44, at 185.
30. Report of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Re: Settlement Implementation, No. 720307, 2-3
(S.F. Super. Ct. dated October 13, 1988) (hereinafter Wells Fargo Settlement Implementation]
(on file in the Santa Clara Law Review office). See also infra text accompanying notes 33-42.
The settlement was the subject of much public attention. See, e.g., Ads Denounce Legal Settle-
ment of Check-Fee Case, Am. Banker, Jan. 13, 1987, at 2. The authors do not opine here as to
whether that settlement as a whole was fair to the class, but rather rely upon the actual post-
settlement data concerning the claims rate in that case and others to conclude that a claims
procedure should not be used alone in future consumer class cases.
31. Agreement for Settlement of Certain Class Actions Against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
and Crocker National Bank, No. 720307 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 13, 1987).
19881
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claim. 82
Plaintiff's expert estimated at the fairness hearing that the par-
tial refund of charges was worth between $6,814,399 and
$13,628,799, predicting that between 40% and 80% of eligible cus-
tomers would apply." The expert's report does not state the number
of people that would constitute this 40-80% of eligible class mem-
bers. Based upon data in the follow-up reports, the average amount
paid on claims was $108.31."I It would take between 62,916 and
125,831 claimants claiming $108.31 each to reach the range of re-
funds estimated to the court in support of the settlement. In fact,
only 8,901 claims were submitted, and only 4,444 paid in whole or
in part, 5 for a total of $481,316.69.
The $481,316.69 paid out would be far less than the $6.8 to
$13.6 million estimated at the time the court approved the class set-
tlement. Instead of reaching 40% to 80% of the eligible class mem-
bers, this refund benefit apparently was claimed and received by less
than 3% of those eligible.
The claims rate for the credit portion of the settlement linked to
credit cards was also quite low. The class counsels' expert estimated
that there were 1,367,878 persons eligible for the credit." Of these,
he estimated that 95% of all eligible customers already holding a
credit card87 and 48% of all other eligible customers would seek the
$18 credit."' The credit was therefore valued at between $12,633,764
and $14,458,272." 9 In fact, the total amount of credits linked to
credit cards extended by the bank was only $818,681.0 The benefit
was received by only 41,747 of the nearly 1.4 million eligible cus-
tomers."1 Thus, the claims rate on this aspect of the settlement was
about 3.03% of eligible class members. That claims rate would have
been even less if the bank had not voluntarily extended the eligibility
period for this benefit by several months. Fully one quarter of those
who received the benefit did so after the expiration of the period
32. Id.
33. Vencill Report, supra note 22, at 6, 12.
34. See Wells Fargo Settlement Implementation, supra note 30, at 3-4. The total
amount paid on claims ($481,316.69) divided by the total number of claims paid (2,393 paid
in full; 560 overpaid; 1,491 paid in part; 4,444 total) equals $108.31.
35. Wells Fargo Settlement Implementation, supra note 30, at 3-4.
36. Vencill Report, supra note 22, at 2.
37. Vencill Report, supra note 22, at 1.
38. Vencill Report, supra note 22, at 3.
39. Vencill Report, supra note 22, at 1-3.
40. Wells Fargo Settlement Implementation, supra note 30, at 2.
41. Declaration of Ann Connolly, Re: Wells Fargo Bank Settlement Implementation.
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called for in the settlement agreement.
Other cases involving large classes have also shown low claims
rates. In Wilson v. Bank of America,"2 the bank was held responsi-
ble at trial for commingling monies from 176,000 borrowers' im-
pound accounts and failing to pay interest on those funds.48 The
judgment in Wilson awarded compensatory damages in the amount
of $47 million and punitive damages in the amount of $54 million."
While the case was on appeal, the parties reached a settlement call-
ing for payment to those persons making claims.45 The class con-
sisted of 170,000 loan customers, but only 31,915 filed refund
claims."6 Only 19% of the Wilson class filed claims, some of which
were disallowed. Only 18% of the class received benefits from the
settlement. 47
IV. FAIRNESS AND ADEQUACY OF SETTLEMENTS WITH Low
CLAIMS RATES
Low claims rates raise serious questions of both fairness to class
members and adequacy of claims procedures to effectuate disgorge-
ment of ill-gotten profits. In Wilson, 18% of the class received pay-
ment on claims, whereas the remaining 82% received no damage re-
covery. In Wells Fargo, less than 3% of those eligible for refunds
received an average of $108.07 each, while the other 97% of eligible
class members did not recover refunds. Similarly, in Wells Fargo,
3% of those eligible for an $18 credit linked to a credit card received
one, while the other 97% received no credit. In Mazur, the 10.5% of
claiming class members received damages, while the other 89.5% did
not. A settlement or judgment which causes a defendant to repay less
than 20% of wrongful profits is unlikely to serve effectively the goal
of disgorgement. Similarly, a settlement which delivers monetary
benefit to less than 20% of the class appears extremely unlikely to be
fair and equitable to all class members.
Fairness to the entire class is a fundamental rule of class action
adjudication.' 8 Thus, a class settlement should not be approved un-
42. No. A020422 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed May 9, 1984).
43. Id. at 1.
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id. at 2-3.
46. Id. at 1. 31,915 claims were filed and 29,802 of these were allowed for a total of
$5,091,171.19. Wilson v. Bank of America, No. A020422, Accounting of Class Claims (S.F.
Super. Ct. filed May 9, 1984) [hereinafter Wilson Accounting].
47. Of the total 31,915 claims filed, 2,113 were rejected. The remaining 29,802 consti-
tute eighteen percent of the 170,000 person class. See Wilson Accounting, supra note 46, at 1.
48. Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1148 (11th Cir. 1983); Piambino v.
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less it is "fair, adequate and reasonable." '49 Trial judges must "re-
view any proposed settlement of a class action to protect non-party
members of the class from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their
rights."50
Most opinions on the fairness of class action settlements do not
directly address the issue of whether an anticipated low claims rate
will render a settlement unfair. The theoretical basis for the court's
fairness determination, however, suggests a duty to consider this is-
sue. The fairness inquiry which precedes approval of a class action
settlement is grounded in the fundamental rule that it is the court's
"duty to ensure that the interests of the class are reflected fairly and
adequately in the decree."'"
A. Judicial Attitudes Regarding Low Claims Rates
In two cases, Norman v. McKee5" and Jamison v. Butcher &
Sherrerd,53 proposed settlements were deemed unfair because each
attempted to compromise some of plaintiffs' claims without compen-
sation for those claims. 4 The Norman court held that a proposed
class settlement may be disapproved if it does not "give due regard to
the interests of those unnamed.""5 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
upheld the disapproval, stating that "[t]he question for the district
judge is whether the proposed settlement is fair and adequate to all
concerned."56 In Jamison, the court held that class members are not
adequately compensated by a proposed settlement in which "they are
releasing their claims without consideration."5 In a class action set-
tlement where there is reason to expect a low claims rate, class mem-
Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1329 (5th Cir. 1980); Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 97 F.R.D. 486, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Leibman v. J. W. Peterson Coal & Oil Co., 73 F.R.D. 531, 534-35 (N.D.
Ill. 1973).
49. 3B J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.80[4], at 23-488 (2d ed. 1987) ("courts must find class settlements to be fair, adequate and
reasonable"); 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
1797, at 358 (2d ed. 1986) (courts must find class settlements "fair and reasonable").
50. Piambino, 610 F.2d at 1327. See also Georgevich v. Strauss, 96 F.R.D. 192, 196
(M.D. Pa. 1982) (court must vigorously act as guardian of the rights of absent class members).
51. Jamison v. Butcher, 68 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
52. 290 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971).
53. 68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
54. Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 33 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff d, 431 F.2d 769, 770
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971);Jamison, 68 F.R.D. at 482.
55. Norman, 290 F. Supp. at 33.
56. Id.
57. Jamison, 68 F.R.D. at 482.
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bers who are unlikely to file claims will lose their cause of action
without compensation, just as the class members in the disapproved
Jamison settlement were asked to sacrifice their claims without
consideration.
One case has explicitly considered an expected low claims rate
in disallowing a proposed class action settlement. In Liebman v.
J.W. Peterson Coal & Oil Co.," a projected claims rate of between
20 and 40% was held too small. The court reasoned that such a low
claims rate "would mean that the defendant would retain a substan-
tial portion of any illegal gains rather than be penalized" for its con-
duct.59 Even if low claims rates had been tolerated by courts in the
past, the court did "not believe that the fairness of any settlement
proposal should be determined on the assumption that the retention
by defendants of some of their illegal profits is the norm ... .
None of the reported cases in which claims rates have been low
contain judicial approval of low claims rates as fair. Newberg's Class
Action Manual shows claims rates for thirty-two cases.61 Newberg's
table contains a column entitled "Claims Filed as a Percentage of
Total Class- Members" which reveals many pathetically low claims
rates. However, these rates are not indicative of judicial approbation
of low claims rates. There are several reasons for this.
First, judicial approval of the claims rates cannot be inferred
because the shortcomings of claims plans are often not apparent for
months after the approval of a settlement. Second, the majority of the
cases Newberg cites appear in the portion of his table tabulating
cases which allowed for pro rata distribution of the fund among the
successful claimants."' Leaving aside the equity of dividing a fund
only among those who file a claim, such schemes can at least serve
the goal of disgorgement of the defendant's ill-gotten gains and of
deterrence.
Third, Newberg's table of claims rates does not show what per-
centage of the total settlement or judgment was exhausted by the
reported claims. For example, in one case cited by Newberg involv-
ing a low claims rate, In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in
Antibiotics Antitrust Actions,6" the low claims rate did not substan-
tially reduce the total recovery because those claims that were filed
58. 73 F.R.D. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
59. Id. at 536.
60. Id.
61. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, Appendix 8-4, at 206-15.
62. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, Appendix 8-4, at 206-15.
63. 410 F. Supp. 669 (D. Minn. 1974).
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nearly exhausted the settlement fund. The Antibiotics settlement al-
located $29.7 million for consumer claims." Although only 981,000
claims were filed from a class of twelve million, the claims sought
more than four times the amount of the settlement fund.6" This is
fundamentally different from a typical large consumer class action
where, an 8% claims rate would allow the defendant to keep 92% of
its illegal profit. For example, suppose a large appliance retailer is
found guilty of overcharging each of its one million retail customers
$1 per item. An 8% claims rate would result in disgorgement of
$80,000 and retention by the defendant of the other $920,000 in ille-
gal profits, thus defeating the dual goals of disgorgement and
deterrence.
Fourth and most important, many of the cases Newberg reports
as having low claims rates did not depend entirely on the claims
procedure for the disbursement of benefits. Additional distribution
mechanisms used in these cases include price rollbacks,66 a default
option to receive a discount on future services,67 and a default option
to contribute one's recovery to a fund for beneficial public projects.6"
West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co. 68 demonstrates the ways
in which alternative remedies may be creatively used in conjunction
with a claims-based procedure. In that case, consumers could choose
not to file a claim and thereby automatically authorize the attorneys
general of their respective states to use their share of the funds for
public health projects. Thus, cy pres relief served the interests of the
injured class members despite the practical impossibility of complete
distribution of the fund in individual claims.
Low claims rates in class action cases do not indicate that the
courts consider low claims rates fair, only that the issue has rarely
been squarely presented in the reported decisions. In addition, alter-
native remedies which can be used in conjunction with claims proce-
dures to make settlements more fair to nonclaiming class members,
such as cy pres fluid recoveries, are a relatively recent development. 0
64. Id. at 675.
65. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, Appendix 8-4, at 206.
66. Colson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 59 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
67. Butowsky v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, C.A. No. 71-1086K (D.
Mass. filed 1975).
68. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affid, 440
F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
69. Id. at 734.
70. See infra notes 99-112.
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B. Effect of Claims Requirements on Socioeconomically
Disadvantaged Class Members
Socioeconomic bias may render a claims-based distribution pro-
cedure unfair to some subgroups within a large consumer class. The
evidence shows a strong tendency of claims procedures to skew the
benefits of a settlement or judgment in favor of the well-educated,
affluent class members and to shortchange the less fortunate."
It can be argued that class members benefit by their eligibility
to make a claim even if they never actually do so. The responsibility
of class counsel and the court to ensure fairness, however, must ex-
tend to ensuring fair distribution of actual benefits and not merely to
equal eligibility. There are very real inequalities in our society
which mean that "equal eligibility" is not the equivalent of true
equality of access to benefits.
Two class members may be equally eligible to file a complex
claim, but they do not have equal access to benefits if one lacks the
ability to understand and complete the claim process. The class
member who lacks adequate facility in the English language to un-
derstand and file a claim form does not have equal access to the
benefits of a claims procedure, despite equal theoretical eligibility.
The class member whose education or experience makes him or her
either unfamiliar with or wary of official-looking forms also does not
have the same access to benefits as the one whose education and cul-
tural background make the filing of a claim form a more familiar
and comfortable procedure.
This thesis was documented in a detailed academic study72 ana-
lyzing the demographics of claimants in the 1975 settlement of the
decade-old In re Antibiotics Antitrust Action . The authors of the
extensive study of claimants to a nationwide fund conducted nearly
1,000 detailed interviews with former claimants and nonparticipating
class members. The demographic data thus gleaned was compared
with similar data on national and state populations. 4 One of the
71. T. BARTSH, F. BODDY, B. KING & P. THOMPSON, A CLASS-ACTION SUIT THAT
WORKED 60-64 (1978). This study was suggested and made possible by the presiding judge,
Miles W. Lord. Judge Lord recognized that the tremendous capital outlay involved in giving
individual notice justified a statistical study to test the efficacy of the notice procedure. The
results of the study would then be made available to assist other courts in similar proceedings.
The study was funded with money from the administrative fund created by the settlement. See
infra notes 72-98 and accompanying text.
72. T. BARTSH, supra note 71, at xii.
73. 410 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1975).
74. T. BARTSH, supra note 71, at xii.
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purposes of the research was "to study the claimants in the class
action proceeding and attempt to identify any personal characteristics
that set this group off from the general population.""5
Among the principal results of the study was the finding that
claimants tended to be "better educated and correspondingly have
higher incomes" than the general class population.7 6 The study
found that the number of claimants reporting a family income of
$25,000 or greater was more than twice the corresponding figure for
the general population." The educational level of the claimants was
reported as 49.3% having some college background, compared to only
30.4% of persons in the general California population.7 8 Racial
demographics were studied with respect to three groups: black, white
and other. The participation by blacks as refund claimants in the
five states studied was only two-thirds of the level expected based
upon black population numbers for those states. 9
Occupational groups associated with higher incomes were sig-
nificantly overrepresented in the group of people who filed claims.
Fully 49.4% of men and 32.5% of women surveyed in the claimant
pool reported their occupation as professional, managerial, or admin-
istrative. In the general population, only 33.2% of men and 24.1% of
women reported membership in these groups.8" By contrast, only
24.3% of men and 7.2% of women claimants surveyed described their
occupations as skilled or manual labor, compared to 42.5% of men
and 14.2% of women in the general population of California.8 The
authors of the study characterized the differences in education and
income level between the claimants and the general population as
"striking."8 They concluded that "participants in future class ac-
tions will be drawn from the responsible, informed, and unalienated
mainstream of society."88
A recent attempt to reach and educate telephone consumers
about rights, ordered by the California Public Utilities Commission,
dramatically highlights the difficulties in effectively educating a
broad segment of the population about consumer rights even with an
extensive information campaign. In this administrative proceeding,
75. T. BARTSH, supra note 71, at 57.
76. T. BARTSH, supra note 71, at xv, 57.
77. T. BARTSH, supra note 71, at 61.
78. T. BARTSH, supra note 71.
79. T. BARTSH, supra note 71, at 61, 64.
80. T. BARTSH, supra note 71, at 65, Table 3-9.
81. T. BARsH, supra note 71.
82. T. BARTSH, supra note 71, at 57.
83. T. BARTSH, supra note 71, at xvi.
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commonly known as the Pacific Bell Marketing Issues proceeding, 4
a coalition of low income and minority groups intervened in rate
proceedings and objected to proposed rate filings on the ground that
Pacific Bell had used allegedly abusive marketing practices to pro-
mote auxiliary telephone services such as call forwarding, speed dial-
ing, and three-way calling. Intervenors alleged that Pacific Bell had
sold these services to persons who had no need of them and to per-
sons who did not know that they had bought auxiliary services.8 5
Intervenors also argued that Pacific Bell had failed to adequately
inform eligible persons about the availability of low cost "lifeline"
telephone service.86
The investigation by the California Public Utilities Commission
found "violations of statutes, general orders, and tariff provisions. "87
The PUC ordered a broad program of customer notification to en-
sure: (1) that customers who were eligible for lifeline service would
learn of that service, and (2) that all customers who had auxiliary
telephone services would learn that they had the services in order to
make an informed decision whether to keep the services or to seek a
refund.88
The Pacific Bell Marketing Issues proceeding was not a classic
claims procedure because customers who received information about
the right to a refund could either claim or decide to keep the services
and forego the refund. Nonetheless, the refund program was similar
to a claims procedure in that its success depended upon educating
those with a right to a refund about that right and motivating them
to make a decision as to whether to exercise that right.
Pursuant to the order of the PUC to engage in an extensive
notification campaign, Pacific Bell mailed announcements to 100% of
its individual residential customers, ran advertisements in daily,
weekly and monthly publications targeted to senior citizens, Chinese,
Koreans, Vietnamese, Blacks, Hispanics and Filipinos, purchased air
time on radio stations serving the Black and Hispanic markets, and
produced a television public service announcement which was shown
as a paid advertisement on television stations serving the Hispanic
84. In re the Application of Pacific Bell, No. 87-12-067 (Dec. 22, 1987) (Application
85-01-034; 1.85-03-078; 01184; C.86-11-028) [hereinafter Pac Bell Application].
85. Marketing Abuse Opening Brief of Public Advocates Minority/Low Income Coali-
tion Application, No. 85-01-034 (Mar. 20, 1987) [hereinafter Abuse Brie].
86. Pac Bell Application, supra note 84, at 68.
87. Pac Bell Application, supra note 84, at 79 (quoting Pac Bell Application 86-08-
026 "mimeo," at 19-20).
88. Pac Bell Application, supra note 84, at 81-82.
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market.8 9 Pacific Bell also contacted 736 community organizations
with offers of brochures, meetings and speakers, with or without
interpreters.
A follow-up study ordered by the PUC9° was done by Field
Research Corporation 9 to determine whether the campaign in fact
made residential customers aware of the availability of lifeline ser-
vice and whether it made customers with auxiliary services aware of
their right to seek refunds of charges paid for those services.
The Field study determined that the notification campaign re-
sulted in moderate levels of awareness in the population as a whole
but significantly less awareness among minority and low income
populations.9" For example, while over half of all customers to
whom speed dialing service was sold during the relevant period
knew they had the service, only 36% of low income customers knew
they were paying for this service. Only 20% of all Hispanic custom-
ers who had this extra service knew that they were paying extra for
it.93 In the subgroup of Hispanic customers who were interviewed in
Spanish, the awareness level was only 9%.9' Similar low awareness
levels were shown for minority and low income customers who had
call forwarding and three-way calling.95
The most telling proof of deficiency in the educational campaign
to inform low income and minority customers was the figures show-
ing the economic and racial breakdown of customers whom the pro-
gram had failed to inform about their eligibility for refunds. Of those
customers who were not aware they had the optional services and
had not received refunds for those services, 48% were low income
and 62% were black or Hispanic.9
The evidence from both the claimants who sought benefits in
89. Testimony of G.J. Sullivan on Marketing Sales Issues, Pacific Bell (U 10C) Appli-
cation No. 85-01-034, at 4-6 (Dec. 9, 1986).
90. Abuse Brief supra note 85, at 2 (quoting CPUC Opinion of May 28, 1986, and
Aug. 6, 1986).
91. Abuse Brief, supra note 85, at Exhibit 725A, Field Exhibit Research Charts, Ap-
pendix A-B.
92. Abuse Brief, supra note 85, at Exhibit 725A, Field Exhibit Research Charts, at
Chart 1.1.
93. Abuse Brief, supra note 85, at Exhibit 725A, Field Exhibit Research Charts, at
Chart 5.8.
94. Abuse Brief supra note 85, at Exhibit 725A, Field Exhibit Research Charts, at
Chart 5.8.
95. Abuse Brief, supra note 85, at Exhibit 725A, Field Exhibit Research Charts, at
Chart 5.8.
96. Abuse Brief supra note 85, at Exhibit 725A, Field Exhibit Research Charts, at
Charts 5.2, 5.7, 5.9.
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1975 in the Antibiotics Antitrust case and the 1987 Field Research
Corporation study of California telephone customers strongly sug-
gests that low income, less sophisticated, less educated and nonnative
English speaking class members do not share in the benefits of a
claims procedure with anything approaching the same frequency as
other societal groups. Instead, a claims requirement, by its very na-
ture, has the unintended effect of skewing the benefits actually deliv-
ered toward the more affluent, educated, and nonminority popula-
tion. Moreover, the Field study shows that more advertising and
more intensive marketing may not solve the problem of unequal
knowledge about rights to claim refunds or similar benefits.' 7
This data has serious implications for a claims procedure since
no class member can make a claim unless he or she first becomes
aware of the right to do so. Faced with the statistics indicating a lack
of benefit to certain segments of the public from the educational cam-
paign in the Pacific Bell proceeding, the California Public Utilities
Commission posed the question which often will face a court in a
consumer class action case involving a large class with small per cap-
ita damages. The PUC stated, "There remains, however, the ques-
tion of what to do about the fact that not everyone has been reached
and not everyone can be reached."9"
The Public Utilities Commission chose a form of cy pres relief
to supplement the direct benefits to the injured ratepayers as a
means of fairly and responsibly providing benefits to the customers
who were not made aware of their rights by the claims procedure.
This remedy will be discussed in detail below.
V. USE OF FLUID RECOVERY TO AUGMENT CLAIMS
PROCEDURES
The very low claims rates in large consumer class actions and
97. Marketing analysts have studied how various factors influence the redemption rates
of cents-off coupons. For the influence of demographic factors, however, "(n]o individual or
household consumer data are now available with respect to redemption or nonredemption."
Reibstein & Traver, Factors Affecting Coupon Redemption Rates, 46 J. MARKETING 102,
105 (Fall 1982). One recent finding from a coupon redemption study offers some support for
the argument for mechanisms to supplement claims procedures. As the authors report,
"[r]edemption rates are declining as the number of coupons [distributed) continues to increase."
Kingsbury, Study Provides Overview of Who's Redeeming Coupons-and Why, 21 Marketing
News, Jan. 2, 1987, at 56, col. 3. The findings suggest that as consumers are inundated with
an ever-increasing barrage of printed advertising in the form of coupons, the likelihood in-
creases that an announcement of a right to claim will go unnoticed, or be ignored as just one
more coupon-type offer.
98. Pac Bell Application, supra note 84, at 83.
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the evidence of inherent socioeconomic bias in a claims requirement
strongly suggests that a claims-based recovery, standing alone, cannot
be fair to a large and diverse class. Instead, claims procedures should
be augmented by another mechanism to ensure that indirect benefits
will flow to those class members who do not make a claim for direct
benefits. In designing these mechanisms, courts have turned to the
equitable doctrine of cy pres.
A. Origin of the Cy Pres Remedy
The doctrine of cy pres originated in the law of charitable
trusts. In that context, it provides that when the literal terms of a
trust become impossible to follow, the funds should be put to "the
next best use," in accord with the purposes of the trust." In class
action litigation, the use of cy pres remedies is often referred to as
"fluid recovery." Fluid recovery is generally used to distribute the
residue of a fund created by settlement or judgment when the claims
rate is less than 100%.'"0
Fluid recovery in consumer class actions is especially suited to
addressing certain of the goals of such cases. The first is ensuring
that defendants completely disgorge any illegally obtained profits.'01
As described by the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Dis-
trict in Bruno v. Superior Court, fluid recovery is necessary where
proof of claims is impractical, because without fluid or cy pres recov-
ery the action would neither compensate nor deter. Relying solely on
a claims procedure where the claims rate is low would allow the
defendant to "benefit from the cumbersome nature of legal proceed-
ings and the lack of sophistication and indolence of the consumer,
and will reward his foresight in stealing from the multitude in small
amounts.' ' 2o
This sentiment was echoed by the California Supreme Court
99. G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431-42 (rev. 2d ed. 1977). See
also In re Estate of Gatlin, 16 Cal. App. 3d 644, 648, 94 Cal. Rptr. 295, 296-97 (1971).
100. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 11.20. For an excellent discussion of cy pres
remedies and a detailed discussion of cases in which they have been used, see Note, The Con-
sumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 729 (1987).
101. Note, Equitable Trusts, supra note 1, at 1597; see Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 475-
76, 715 P.2d at 573, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 614 (describing fluid recovery as the payment of the
total damage liability to a class fund, followed by payment of individual claims from the fund,
the use of the residue to benefit absent class members).
102. Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 127, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345-46
(1981) (quoting Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Ac-
tions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 846 (1974)).
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when it stated that the use of fluid recovery is imperative to ensure
that guilty defendants do not keep their ill-gotten gains simply be-
cause "their conduct harmed large numbers of people in small
amounts instead of small numbers of people in large amounts."1 ' As
Newberg puts it, policy considerations "dictate a preference for an
appropriate cy pres distribution rather than a reversion of undistrib-
uted funds to the defendant, the alleged wrongdoer."" 4 In the settle-
ment context, cy pres is equally important because it can be used to
ensure that the class will in fact receive benefits, whether direct or
indirect, of some minimum amount even if the claims rate falls short
of that projected by the parties at the time of the settlement. 0 5
A cy pres distribution mechanism is usually used to provide
benefits to nonclaiming class members after individual claims distri-
bution has taken place. The implementation of fluid recovery or cy
pres distribution usually involves three steps.'06 First, the entire
corpus of the settlement is placed into escrow for distribution to the
class. After the total amount of the judgment or settlement is paid
into a fund, class members are notified and given the opportunity to
claim their individual benefits. Lastly, the residual funds are distrib-
uted by whichever method the court or the parties have selected.'0
B. Methods of Cy Pres Fluid Recovery
Methods of fluid recovery include price rollbacks, escheat, pro
rata fund sharing, and trust funds.' 8 The first three methods are
103. Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 472, 715 P.2d at 571, 224 Cal. Rptr. 612.
104. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 11.20, at 416-17. See also Six (6) Mexican Work-
ers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 641 F. Supp. 259, 265 (D. Ariz. 1986). As the court stated in
Six Mexican Workers, "In contrast to having the undistributed damages revert back to defend-
ants, which would in effect reward the defendants for their inadequate record-keeping, fluid
recovery distribution would serve to compel observance of the statute." Id. at 269.
105. For cases where cy pres has been used in settlements, see Ohio Pub. Interest Cam-
paign v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Ohio 1982); In re Three Mile Island
Litigation, 557 F. Supp. 96, 96-97 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (settlement calling for one-fifth of total
payment to be used for a public health fund). The following cases are described in I H.
NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 11.20, at nn.57-459: Girsh v. Jepson, 64 F.R.D. 86 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (residue of securities settlement award to three law libraries); Sanchez v. Lowell
Leberman, 79 F.R.D. 21 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (residue paid to medical center); Lindy Bros.
Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 382 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(residue of antitrust settlement awarded to establish law school scholarships).
106. See generally Malina, Fluid Class Recovery as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust
Cases, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477, 482 (1972).
107. See Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 472-73, 715 P.2d at 571, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
For cases using this procedure, see Girsh, 64 F.R.D. at 86; Sanchez, 79 F.R.D. at 21; Lindy
Bros., 322 F. Supp. at 999.
108. See 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 10.17, § 10.18, § 10.19.
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generally less appropriate for large consumer class actions than the
trust fund.
1. Price Rollbacks
The price rollback approach requires the offending company to
lower its prices for a given time until the undeserved profits are
"regained" by consumers."0 9 Price rollbacks can be an appropriate
remedy in conjunction with a claims procedure when the overcharge
being addressed is for a product or service repeatedly purchased by a
relatively small number of customers and where the defendant oper-
ates without competition." 0 Price rollbacks are problematic in large
consumer class actions because in nonmonopoly markets they compel
the consumer to obtain his "refund" by making further purchases of
the defendant's products to the benefit of the defendant and the detri-
ment of the defendant's competitors."' Also, if the defendant is a
wholesaler or otherwise does not directly control retail prices, the
court overseeing a price rollback will be faced with the gargantuan
task of monitoring thousands of retail prices to ensure that the sav-
ings are not swallowed by the retailers." 2
2. Escheat
Escheat is a concept borrowed from property law. In property
law, escheat allows for the reversion of property to the state where
there is no individual competent to claim or inherit it."' In the class
action context, funds unclaimed after a claims procedure may be dis-
tributed to the state through "earmarked escheat," where the funds
are designated to further the purposes of the underlying cause of
action, or through "general escheat," where the recovery goes into
the state general fund." 4 Earmarked escheat requires the coopera-
109. See generally Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 472, 715 P.2d at 571, 224 Cal. Rptr. at
612; 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 11.18, at 380; Note, Consumer Trust Fund, supra note
100, at 754-55. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1967) (reduction of cab fares); Colson, 59 F.R.D. at 324 (reduction of room rates to offset
illegal charges on incoming phone calls); see also cases cited in Note, Consumer Trust Fund,
supra note 100, at 753-55.
110. Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 473, 715 P.2d at 571, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 612; Note,
Equitable Trusts, supra note 1, at 1593.
111. See 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 10.18, at 380; Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at
473-74, 715 P.2d at 572, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
112. Note, Consumer Trust Fund, supra note 100, at 755.
113. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (5th ed. 1979).
114. Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 474, 715 P.2d at 572, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 613; see
generally 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 10.19, at 380-82.
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tion of the involved government agency and thus should not be used
when the government is in any way antagonistic to the purposes of
the case.'" Furthermore, the award of earmarked escheat to the
state may cause the Legislature to reduce its outlays for the benefited
programs to match the amount of the award, thus effectively turning
earmarked funds into general funds and ignoring the underlying
purpose of the class action." 6 This will produce no direct benefit for
the class, only a miniscule overall increase in government funds.
General escheat is easy to administer, but it is the least focused
method of distribution in that it spreads the benefits among all tax-
payers and there is no attempt to ensure that the underlying pur-
poses of the litigation are served. For this reason, the California Su-
preme Court has said that general escheat is a "last resort" that
should be used only when a more directed form of fluid recovery
cannot be fashioned.'1
3. Claimant Fund Sharing
In claimant fund sharing, the court allows the award to be di-
vided pro rata among all those who successfully apply."" Like other
cy pres means that specify a total dollar amount to be paid by the
defendant, claimant fund sharing is an effective mechanism for en-
suring disgorgement and deterrence. However, it may exacerbate the
inequities inherent in a claims procedure as it increases the recovery
of those who claim but provides nothing for those class members who
do not file a claim." 9
The evidence that certain groups are likely to be under-
represented as claimants makes it particularly inappropriate to give
their benefits to other claimants without first exploring indirect
means of delivering benefits to nonclaimant class members.
115. Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 474, 715 P.2d at 572, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
116. See Note, Consumer Trust Fund, supra note 100, at 752.
117. Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 475, 715 P.2d at 572-73, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 613. As
Newberg puts it, escheat serves the deterrence goal, but not the compensation goal of class
actions. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 10.19, at 381. In California, the Civil Code expressly
confirms that the ordinary rules of escheat are not intended to deprive the courts of the power
to order other cy pres uses. CAL. Csv. PROC. CODE § 1519.5 (West Supp. 1988) (noted in
People v. Parkmerced Co., 88 D.A.R. 1907 (1988)).
118. Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 475-76, 715 P.2d at 573, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 614; Note,
Consumer Trust Fund, supra note 100, at 755-59; Note, Equitable Trusts, supra note 1, at
1600.
119. Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 476, 715 P.2d at 573, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 614; Note,
Consumer Trust Fund, supra note 100, at 755, 757-58. Fund-sharing may also create a con-
flict of interest for the named plaintiff since his or her share will increase if the level of
participation by the class is low. Id. at 757.
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4. Consumer Trust Funds
The method of cy. pres or fluid recovery most appropriate in
consumer class actions is the consumer trust fund. A consumer trust
fund remedy operates either by endowing a new project or by fund-
ing an existing private program. A consumer trust fund "achieves
the cy pres purpose most closely" 12 for several reasons. It can be
structured to serve the purposes of the underlying litigation, thus
avoiding the uncertainties of earmarked escheat or general escheat; it
avoids the market disruption of price rollbacks; and most impor-
tantly, consumer trust funds can be structured to serve all the mem-
bers of the class, regardless of their sophistication or socioeconomic
status. The benefit takes the form of increased services to, or protec-
tion of rights of the entire class, which is preferable to limiting bene-
fits only to those who successfully complete a claim.
Many decisions have upheld settlements that funded consumer
trust funds as part of a larger settlement, usually after a claims pro-
cedure. In In re Three Mile Island Litigation,121 the court approved
the creation and funding of a foundation to study the biological ef-
fects of radiation exposure from future nuclear power accidents. 22
Another settlement approved the use of a residual from an antitrust
class action to fund loans for needy students at two law schools. 2 In
Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers,'21 the court en-
dorsed the concept of fluid recovery for funds which could not be
claimed by migratory farmworkers.12 5 Plaintiffs asked that the funds
be placed in trust for economic development in those areas of Mexico
in which the plaintiff farmworkers reside. 26 The court held that it
had broad equitable discretion to award this or any other cy pres
recovery, and ordered the plaintiffs to submit a detailed proposal for
further consideration.
In the Department of Energy cases, collectively known as the
Petroleum Violation Escrow Account Cases (PVEA),' 27 a consumer
120. Note, Consumer Trust Fund, supra note 100, at 765.
121. 557 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. 1982).
122. Id.
123. Lindy Bros., 382 F. Supp. at 1077.
124. 641 F. Supp. 259, 265 (D. Ariz. 1986).
125. Id. at 265.
126. Six Mexican Workers, 641 F. Supp. at 265.
127. United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 773 F.2d
1240 (T.E.C.A. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986), rehg denied, 474 U.S. 1112
(1988). For a discussion of the theoretical bases for the trust fund concept in the PVEA cases,
see Note, Collecting Overcharges from the Oil Companies: The Department of Energy's Resti-
tutionary Obligation, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1039 (1980).
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trust fund remedy was adopted for that portion of the overcharges
allocated by decision or settlement to consumers rather than to com-
mercial users of overpriced oil. In one of the PVEA cases, for exam-
ple, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia determined
that the best way to give restitution to injured consumers of oil
which had been overpriced during the price controls of the late
1970's was to use the overcharge monies for one or more of five
energy conservation programs.128
The California Public Utilities Commission utilized a cy pres
consumer trust fund remedy to benefit customers who were not
reached through a program of education of the right to claim a re-
fund. When the follow-up study in the Pacific Bell Marketing Is-
sues 1 29 administrative proceeding showed that significant subgroups
were not effectively educated about the right to a refund, the Public
Utilities Commission imposed upon Pacific Bell a "limited purpose
penalty" of $16.5 million for the purpose of providing restitution to
these injured ratepayers. The penalty was designed for the "estab-
lishment of a trust to further ratepayer educational efforts." '
C. Structuring Consumer Trust Funds
The structure of the consumer trust fund can vary widely de-
pending on the goals of the original litigation, the amount of money
available, and the time period over which the funds will be used.
The court has broad discretion to order uses of the fund which will
both deter future violations and also compensate or serve the same
group of people who were victims of the practice that formed the
basis for the original suit.
1. Statement of Purpose Combined with Oversight by an
Independent Board
A general statement of purpose or issues can be combined with
delegation of ongoing supervision to an appointed board to provide
both guidance and the necessary flexibility to ensure maximum bene-
fit to the injured consumers.
In the Pacific Bell Marketing Issues proceeding, for example,
the California Public Utilities Commission stated the purposes for
128. See supra note 28. For additional cases using the consumer trust fund and a de-
tailed discussion of the merits of the trust fund format in particular types of cases, see Note,
Consumer Trust Fund, supra note 100, at 759-65.
129. See Pac Bell Application, supra note 84, at 85-86.
130. See Pac Bell Application, supra note 84.
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the funds, but left open to future determination the particular types
of activities that would be funded to best achieve those purposes. It
stated that the funds "should be used broadly to promote ratepayer
education and understanding of the telecommunications system, and
to educate ratepayers about their service options in the increasing
competitive telecommunications environment."' 1 It identified a wide
variety of possible educational efforts, including mass media pro-
grams, educational forums, community outreach efforts, and grants
to selected groups, but it did not say which should be used. 3"
Similarly, in Stern v. U.S. Sprint,"' a telephone overcharge
case, the Superior Court of Los Angeles approved a plan of settle-
ment calling for the creation of a $1,000,000 fund to finance a Cali-
fornia nonprofit public benefit corporation. The purpose of the cor-
poration would be to "further the interests of consumer protection
through a wide range of activities which may include the dissemina-
tion of consumer information, establishment of a consumer complaint
center or clearinghouse, establishment of fellowships for work on
consumer protection issues in academic or other settings, and partici-
pation in administrative hearings or litigation."""
In Vasquez v. Avco Financial Services,"' the residual funds in
a case brought under the California Unruh Retail Credit Act" 6 and
other consumer protection statutes were designated to be used by
Consumers Union"' "for a purpose that is reasonably designed to
benefit those persons who would otherwise have received the re-
fund.""' That fund is used to support the California Credit and
Finance Project, which engages in education, research, administra-
131. See Pac Bell Application, supra note 84, at 86.
132. See Pac Bell Application, supra note 84.
133. See Stern v. U.S. Sprint, No. 000933 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 4, 1988).
134. Id. Stipulation and Plan of Settlement I 8(D)(3), at 12-13. Court approval of that
settlement is now on appeal in the California Second Appellate District.
135. Application for Approval of Amended Memorandum of Understanding, Vasquez v.
Avco Financial Svcs., No. NCC119338 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed May 9, 1984) [hereinafter Vas-
quez Memorandum].
136. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1801-1812.20 (West 1985).
137. Consumers Union was selected as the recipient of these funds in part because of its
reputation for vigorous consumer advocacy. Vasquez Memorandum, supra note 135, at 4.
Consumers Union is a nonprofit membership organization chartered in 1936 to provide infor-
mation, education, and counsel about consumer goods, services, and the management of family
income. 53 Consumer Rep. 539, 594 (Sept. 1988). Consumers Union publishes Consumer
Reports, a monthly magazine, which carries articles rating products that Consumers Union
has tested, as well as articles on consumer services and issues which affect consumer welfare
(For example, see Who Can Afford a Nursing Home, 53 CONSUMER REP. 300 (May 1988);
Garbage Bags: Which Ones are Truly Hefty?, 53 CONSUMER REP. 339 (May 1988).).
138. Vasquez Memorandum, supra note 135, at 4.
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tive and legislative advocacy, and litigation."8 9 After the effectiveness
of the Consumers Union cy pres project was demonstrated, other
courts approved agreements awarding residual funds to Consumers
Union for consumer advocacy and education.140
This form of cy pres trust fund remedy has been described as
the "existing organization" model because under it the court or the
parties select an existing consumer organization with a proven track
record to use the funds for the benefit of persons affected by the
practices which were the subject of the initial suit."' It was recently
endorsed by the California Court of Appeal in People v. Parkmerced
Co."" In that case, the trial court awarded wrongfully withheld se-
curity deposits whose owners could not be located to the tenants' or-
ganization for use in representing the interests of the current
tenants. 143
In both Avco and the Pacific Bell Marketing Issues matter, the
trust fund contained a broad definition of purpose and a delegation
of day-to-day decisions on activities to be funded either to a
grantmaking board or to an existing consumer organization. The use
of a statement of purpose and the involvement of existing organiza-
tions, advisory or grantmaking boards, and class counsel can mini-
mize the need for ongoing supervision by the court."' The court
should, of course, retain jurisdiction in the event that changed cir-
cumstances require a modification of the original order.1 45
139. The California Credit and Finance Project is advised by a fifteen-member board
that includes academicians, government lawyers, attorneys who specialize as class counsel, and
a consumer complaint specialist.
140. Proposed Order Re: Approval of Class Settlement and Final Judgment of Dismis-
sal at 3, Sturdevant v. Hibernia Bank, First National Bank of Chicago, No. 814105 (S.F.
Super. Ct. filed Oct. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Hibernia Settlement].
141. Note, Consumer Trust Fund, supra note 100, at 760-61.
142. 198 Cal. App. 3d 683, 244 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1988).
143. Id. at 693, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
144. In response to arguments that fluid recovery unnecessarily complicates the simple
mechanics of a claims procedure, the court's defense of fluid recovery in Antibiotics Antitrust
case is relevant: "[n either the asserted complexity of the issues nor the magnitude of the claim-
ants and the asserted damages can be allowed to preclude the fair administration of justice. A
judicial system which places a higher premium on convenient administration than on redress of
grievances soon ceases to be just." In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Anti-
trust Actions, 410 F. Supp. 659, 669 (D. Minn. 1974). The Antibiotics Antitrust court further
stated that, "the Court fully intends that the money being paid for the consumers in this action
will go to them. . . .Hard work and imagination will be required but these two requirements
are not new to any of the parties or to the Court in this litigation .. " Id.
145. For example, suppose that a court awarded a residual fund to a consumer organi-
zation to advocate for consumers in connection with credit life insurance. Suppose further that
the consumer organization was successful in securing legislation or administrative regulations
adequately addressing the problems faced by consumers in the pricing and sale of that product.
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2. Determining the Amount of the Trust Fund
In the Pac Bell Marketing Issues matter, the PUC's continuing
jurisdiction allowed it to set the dollar amount of the trust fund after
completion of the customer notification program and extensive fol-
low-up studies into the effectiveness of that program. Counsel nego-
tiating a particular class settlement, however, and a court attempting
to craft a class judgment do not have the benefit of knowing the fu-
ture claims rate or demographics of claimants.
Although neither the court nor the parties can predict future
claims rates with certainty, they can use the cy pres consumer trust
fund mechanism to ensure benefit to the class members in the event
of a low claims rate. This can be accomplished by setting a predeter-
mined dollar amount that will be paid directly to claimants if possi-
ble and "poured over" into cy pres uses if it is not exhausted by
claims. Such a pour-over provision: (1) maximizes the benefit deliv-
ered directly to class members, and (2) ensures a floor on the total
value of benefits to the class if the claims rate is lower than origi-
nally anticipated.
In Ohio Public Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods,'" for ex-
ample, the value of unclaimed coupons was poured over into a con-
sumer trust fund. The principal remedy was $20 worth of coupons
redeemable for groceries, distributed by mailing to every household
in the geographic area, unless that household had opted out. The
settlement also called for payments to a trust fund for the purchase
of food for the needy. The amount to be paid into the trust fund
increased as the coupon redemption rate fell. " 7
Another case in whih the amount of the cy pres trust fund
monies varied inversely with the direct claims paid was West Vir-
ginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co. 148 In that case, the class notice informed
eligible individuals that the failure to file a claim would be deemed
to authorize the various states, through their attorneys general, to
recover on their behalf. " 9 The unreported stipulated judgment in
Sturdevant v. Hibernia Bank150 used a combination of claimant
The consumer organization or the class counsel might then apply to the court for use of the
remaining funds on related issues affecting the same original class members. On the other
hand, a more flexible initial statement of purposes could have avoided the need to apply for
such a modification.
146. 546 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
147. Ohio Public Interest, 546 F. Supp. at 5.
148. 440 F.2d at 1079.
149. Id. at 1091.
150. See Hibernia Settlement, supra note 140.
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fund sharing and a pour-over of residual funds for cy pres use. The
court created a $200,000 settlement fund and called for claims by
class members. It specified that each claimant would receive between
45% and 100% of the total challenged fees paid to Hibernia Bank. If
the claims did not exhaust the fund, each claimant would receive a
100% refund of all the challenged fees.151 The settlement further
provided that "any portion of the settlement fund which remains un-
distributed shall be paid as a cy pres remedy to Consumers Union
for the purposes of research, advocacy, and education concerning
banking practices for the general benefit of California bank custom-
ers.152 Those claiming refunds exhausted only nine percent of the
settlement fund. The cy pres provision for the residue ensured that
the remaining amount of the settlement would inure to the benefit of
the class.
Some courts have approved settlements calling for a discrete
amount of money to be paid for cy pres trust fund use which does
not vary with the claims rate. For example, in Rudolfi v. Bank of
America, " the court approved a settlement agreement calling for a
claims procedure for credits and coupons, as well as payments to a
consumer trust fund totalling $2.5 million over ten years. In Rebney
v. Wells Fargo Bank,54 the court-approved settlement agreement in-
cluded a provision for the payment of $750,000 for a public televi-
sion series on consumer financial issues and $250,000 for consumer
research and education on personal financial issues.
A cy pres fund in which the amount going into the fund varies
inversely with the claims rate offers an important advantage over a
fund in which the amount is separately set and unchangeable. When
the fund is created from a residue remaining after claims are made,
the fund acts as an insurance policy for the class to assure that bene-
fits are delivered, even if the claims rate is unexpectedly low. More-
over, the assurance that the funds will be paid to cy pres uses if there
are insufficient claimants provides the defendant with an incentive to
maximize class member knowledge of the right to make a claim. The
defendant has every incentive to encourage claims by its present or
former customers so that the funds go back to them rather than be-ing poured over into cy pres use. If, on the other hand, the total
amount of the judgment or settlement fund is set in advance, the
defendant has no incentive to make certain that class members learn
151. See Hibernia Settlement, supra note 140, at 2-3.
152. See Hibernia Settlement, supra note 140, at 6.
153. No. 720308 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 16, 1987).
154. No. 720307 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 4, 1988).
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of their right to make a claim.
3. Interest Earned on Cy Pres Consumer Trust Funds
An important aspect of the management of consumer trust
funds is ensuring that monies awaiting distribution earn interest for
the class. The interest on funds placed into escrow or held by plain-
tiff's counsel or an independent third party on behalf of the class can
be significant. In one antibiotics antitrust class action, the interest
totalled at least $8.7 million.5
4. Financial Accountability and Reporting Requirements
Financial accountability and reporting requirements are essen-
tial to any settlement or order setting up a consumer trust fund. In
the Pacific Bell Marketing Issues matter, the California Public Util-
ities Commission ordered procedures to facilitate setting up the trust
fund and the payment of monies therefrom. First, it ordered that
funds be placed in an interest bearing account, so that the interest
would accrue for uses benefitting the injured ratepayers.156 Second, it
created a trust disbursements committee and set a goal for the com-
mittee of disbursing $3 million per year for activities to benefit rate-
payers over each of the next five years.' The Commission required
that the financial trustee file annual accountings with the PUC exec-
utive director showing the amounts disbursed, the identity of those
receiving disbursements, and the account or trust balances as of the
same period. 58 It further expressly ordered that the administrative
defendant should not benefit from the trust or further its marketing
goals or any other corporate profit motive by virtue of the trust.""
In Vasquez v. Avco Financial Services,160 in which funds were
awarded to Consumers Union for use in consumer advocacy and ed-
ucation, the Memorandum of Understanding required annual au-
155. Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1973) (dis-
cussed in I H. NEWBERG, supra note 1 § 12.05, at 527 n.30, § 12.25, at 565).
For other settlement agreements requiring the payment of interest, see I H. NEWBERG,
supra note 1, § 12.05, at 528 n.37 (citing Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., CA No. 70-
933 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (unreported class settlement notice, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1973)), and 527
n.31 (citing Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., CA Nos. 3707, 3722 (D. Del. 1973)
(unreported partial class settlement notice, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 1973, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12,
1973)); see also Hartford Hosp., 52 F.R.D. at 135.
156. Pac Bell Application, supra note 84, at 87.
157. Pac Bell Application, supra note 84, at 86, 328.
158. Pac Bell Application, supra note 84, at 86, 328.
159. Pac Bell Application, supra note 84, at 86-87.
160. Vasquez Memorandum, supra note 135, at NCC 11933B.
[Vol. 28
CLASS ACTIONS
dited financial statements, semiannual reports of activities to an advi-
sory board, and semiannual plans of anticipated work to be
submitted to the original class counsel."'
VI. CONCLUSION
The goals of consumer class actions are threefold: disgorgement
of unlawful profits, deterrence of future wrongdoing, and compensa-
tion of the injured class members. When small amounts are at stake
for each member of a large class, special care must be taken to en-
sure that the distribution mechanism does not "reward [the defend-
ant] his foresight in stealing from the multitude in small
amounts."162
Whether a class action is resolved by settlement or by judgment,
counsel and the courts have an obligation to ensure that the remedy
is fair to all those whose interests are compromised, and not only to
those with the sophistication to learn about and use a claims proce-
dure. The consumer trust fund remedy can be used to provide indi-
rect relief when vigorous efforts to reach individual class members
are unlikely to be effective in reaching, educating, and motivating the
class members to claim a relatively small monetary benefit per class
member.
There is substantial evidence of very low claims rates in recent
large consumer class cases. Further, demographic studies show that
claims procedures do not evenly benefit class members across socio-
economic lines. Because of these factors, counsel should be hesitant to
propose, and the courts even more hesitant to approve, claims proce-
dures in class action settlements without back-up mechanisms such
as the consumer trust fund to ensure adequate benefits to all class
members.
161. Vasquez Memorandum, supra note 135, at NCC 11933B.
162. Bruno, 127 Cal. App. 3d at 127, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46.
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